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We live in irrational times. Astrology
and crystal healing have never been
stronger. Political argument is
gradually eroding, to be replaced by
mudslinging and the repetition of
half-baked opinion. Recently a
sweet-looking old lady sitting next to
me in an aircraft told me how glad
she was that the experimental
medication she was taking hadn’t
been tested on animals. I didn’t
point out that if this was true, she
had just been made the experimental
animal herself (it didn’t seem
perfectly British and polite). Isn’t it a
relief to be a scientist, last bastion of
truth in a world that has willingly
decided it’s cool to be gullible?
Recently, though, things have
conspired to make me wonder if
we’re as questioning as we ought to
be. Several (maybe even most) fields
centre around work that contains
obvious errors, but nobody seems to
mind because the answers agree
with their preconceptions. A brief
ask-around in the coffee room
reveals that this is nearly universal.
Everyone’s field depends on
inhibitors that aren’t specific, or only
inhibit a fraction of what they
should, assays that will only work
under artificial, distorted conditions,
or whatever.
The literature, too, is full of
howlers. I spotted a particularly
good one recently — a much-cited
result in which two completely
unrelated protein sequences were
aligned and said to be homologous
(it’s amazing what you can do with a
sprinkling of gaps and judicious use
of bold text). I’m sure you have your
own examples. 
It’s not surprising that this type
of error exists or gets published.
We’re all mortal, and nearly
everyone is prepared to tweak their
work a bit, if only to show the world
how cool it is. The thing that really
surprises me is how many bits of
dogma are known to be wrong but
are still trotted out because they
point in the right direction. It’s as if
science has a split personality.
Referees will brutally criticise a
conclusion that is probably correct
but not proven beyond doubt, while
arguments that they know to be
wrong are untouched because
everyone in the field accepts them.
The most rigorous critics of other
people’s work believe some
astonishingly dumb things
themselves, and never seem to
notice the inconsistency.
Many fields centre around work
that contains obvious errors, but
nobody seems to mind
One striking example of credulity is
philosophical: the number of
practising scientists who believe in a
specific, objective ‘scientific
method’. A generation of historians
and philosophers of science have
shown that scientists aren’t
objective or dispassionate, and that
the methods of different branches of
science have almost nothing in
common with one another. Despite
this, you can still meet scientists
who think they follow some clear
but unwritten code that
distinguishes the real science they
do from the subjective nonsense
outside.
A letter in Nature a few years
back violently criticized anyone who
denied that science was objective, on
the grounds that it diminished public
confidence in science and thus
funding levels. But nobody who has
gone a few times through the peer
review process of the top journals
could still believe that publication is
underpinned by objectivity. This
doesn’t mean that science is just the
same as astrology, witchcraft or
religion, as Paul Feyerabend and
followers have suggested. Science
works because it tries to test and
explain nature, it’s just that scientists
are as subjective as any other group
of humans in deciding what
constitutes a test and/or what
constitutes an answer.
The opposite of credulity is
worse still. There’s nothing sadder
than a scientist who doesn’t believe
in anything, whatever the evidence,
if they can find a way to rubbish it.
They turn up in conferences every
now and then — you know, the sad,
desiccated-looking people who jump
down the throats of speakers
whenever they say anything that isn’t
concretely obvious. Questioning
everything all at once doesn’t help —
you can only test one problem at a
time (in my understanding of
scientific enquiry, anyway) and
disbelieving everything at once
doesn’t make you more likely to
come to any kind of answer.
So, is it really so bad that we’re
gullible? I don’t think so. We’re
(nearly) all human beings, and the
problems that we try to understand
are fantastically complex. If they
weren’t, as my former boss loved to
say, someone else would have solved
them already. I just wish that
supervisors, referees, grant
committees and that whole panoply
of people who sit in judgement over
each other’s careers were better at
recognising our own weaknesses and
admitted to being inconsistent.
In any case, we ought perhaps to
get better at forgiving people for
saying things that conflict with our
own world view. After all, we’re
probably carrying a stack of wrongful
dogmas ourselves. Let he that is
without sin cast the first stone.
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